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B. P. HALL et ai., Respondents, v. HENRY CHAMBER-
LAIN et aI., Appellants. 
[1] Taxation-Tax Deeds-Ourative Acts.-A statute enacted to 
cure errors or irregularities in tax sales and deeds is of no 
avail to a person claiming title by virtue of a tax deed from 
the state where the right of a transferee of the person having 
title at the time the delinquent tax proceedings were initiated, 
vested prior to the effective date of the curative statute. 
[2] Id.-Actions Affecting Tax Titles - Burden of Proof. -In a 
quiet-title action by one claiming under a deed on foreclosure 
of mortgage against the holder of a tax title,. the defendants 
elaiming ineffectiveness of the foreclosure deed because not 
recorded until dtcr the curative tax act have the burden of 
proving that when the state took the tax deed or when the 
eurative act became effective it acted in good faith and with-
out notice of plaintiff's interest. 
[8] Id.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Sale to State-Notice of Sale. 
-A notice of sale was fatally defective where it failed to com-
ply with the existing law in that it failed to state correctly 
the amount for which the property was sold to the state, but 
instead, under the heading "Least amount accepted at sale," 
specified an amount greater than that for which the property 
was801d. 
[4] Id.-Tax Deeds-Effect.-Under former Pol Code, 55 3786, 
3787, the tax deed was only prima facie evidence of due publi-
cation of the delinquent tax list and the giving of notice. 
[5] Id.-Tax Deeds-Effect.-Under former Pol. Code, § 3786, • 
direction that notice of sale to the state be returned to the 
sender if not delivered within a certain time different from 
that fUed in the statute was a fatal defect which was not cured 
by the tax deed. 
[8] Id.-Tax Deeds-Effect.-A tax deed from the state is not 
conclusive evidence of the regularity of all the proceedings to 
its execution where the interest of an intervening owner inter-
vened before the enactment changing the former rule and 
making the tax deed conclusive evidence. (See Rev. & Tax. 
[1] See 24 OalJur. 30,472; 51 Am.Jur. 678. 
iricK. Dig. References: [1] Taxation, § 347; [2] Taxation, 5380; 
[3] Taxation, § 312; [4] Taxation, § 366(4}t [5] Taxation, 
§ 366(3); [6] Taxation, § 368; [7] Limitation of Actions, § 135; 
[8] Taxation, § 377.1; [9] Limitation -of Actions, § 144-
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Code, § 3nl, formerly Pol. Code, § 3836.1,as added in 
Stats.1939, eh. 529.) 
[7] Limitation of Aetions-Pleading.-A statute of limitations 
waived if it is not pleaded. 
[8] Taxation-Actions Meeting Tax Titles-Limitations.-In aD 
action to quiet title by the holders of a mortgage foreclosure" 
deed against claimants under a tax deed, defendants could not 
rely on the statute of limitations without pleading it. 
[9] Limitation of Actions-Pleading.-To justify application 
the rule that the statute of limitations may be pleaded by 
pleading the facts rather than by making a specific reference 
to the statute, there must be some expression in the pleadmg'-
that lateness of the commencement of the action is a ground of ,< 
defense. ;' 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ven- ; 
tura County. Ernest D. Wagner, Judge assigned. Affirmed. 
Action to quiet title to real property. Judgment for plain-'~ 
tiffs affirmed. ' 
M. Arthur Waite, District Attorney, Julien G. Hathaway, 
Deputy District Attorney, Edward C. Maxwell and William 
T. Selby for Appellants. 
Fred N. Bowser, Attorney General, and E. G. Benard, Dep-
uty Attorney General, as amici curiae on behalf of Appellants. , 
Wm. MacKenzie Brown and Chas. F. Gerard for Respond-
ents. 
CARTER, J .-This appeal involves an action to quiet title 
by plaintiffs based upon their claim of ownership of real prop- , 
erty by virtue of a title derived from the predecessor of the . 
record owner (that is, the owner whose title was claimed to 
have been divested by proceedings for sale of the property 
for delinquent taxes). Defendants, Henry and Katherine 
Chamberlain, based their claim of title on a tax deed from 
the state. Plaintiffs prevailed in the court below, the court 
finding fatal irregularities in the delinquent tax aaIes and I 
tax deeds. • 
It appears that in 1932, Pan American Bank of California i 
(the predecessor in title of plaintiffs) was the owner of the I 
properly. The taxes assessed on the property for that y.~) 
not haTing been paid, the property was sold to the state 'b1 ; 
(7] See 16 Oal.Jur. 603; 34 Am.Jur. 333. 
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operation of law in 1933. The court found that the Oalifor-
nia Bank became the owner of the property on February 14, 
1938, by "Oommissioner's Deed on Foreclosure:' evidently 
the result of a mortga~e foreclosure in which the Pan Ameri-
can Bank of Oalifornia was the owner-mortgagor and the 
California Bank the mortgagee. Five years having elapsed 
since the sale to the state, the tax collector conveyed the 
property to the state by tax deed on July 1, 1938. On July 9, 
1943, the Oalifornia Banlt conveyed the property to plaintift's. 
Following delinquent tax proceedings the state sold the prop-
erty to the Ohamberlains and executed a tax deed to them 
on March 20, 1944. The curative acts (statutes healing ir-
regularities in tax sale proceedings) relied upon by the 
Chamberlains as remedying any irregularities in the tax sales 
and deeds, became effective on August 4, 1943, and thereafter. 
(Stats. 1943, ch. 458; Stats. 1945, ch. 1134.) 
[1] Before discussing the alleged irregularities in the 
tax sales and deeds it must first be observed that the curative 
acts (supra) are of no avail to the Ohamberlains in view of 
the rule announced by this court in Miller v. McKenna, 23 
Oa1.2d 774 [147 P.2d 531]. In that case some of the property 
was sold to the state for delinquent taxes in 1912 and the 
rest in 1918. The first part was sold and conveyed by the 
state to a private purchaser in 1917, and the remainder in 
1923. Like in the instant case, defendants rested their title 
on tax deeds. Plaintiffs' title was based upon an interest 
gained from a sherift"s sale and deed in a mortgage fore-
closure proceeding in 1937, the mortgage having been exe-
cuted in 1915. The' essence of the holding in the Miller case, 
as later stated by this court, was that: "The decision . . • 
withheld from the application of the [curative] act, in accord-
ance with the limitation of section 2 (b) thereof, the vested 
right of the plaintiff which had intervened prior to the ef-
fective date of the curative datute." [Emphasis added.] 
(City of Compton v. Boland, 26 Oal.2d 310, 313. 314 [158 
P.2d 397].) An effort is made to distinguish the Miller case 
on the ground that there the mortgagee had an interest prior 
to the institution of tax proceedings, but even assuming that 
would make a difference, the mortgage in the Miller case was 
executed after the sale by operation of law to the state for 
delinquent taxes. In any event we fail to see what dift'erence 
it makes. As seen from the facts in the Miller case and the 
interpretation of its holding in City of Compton v. Boland, 
supra, the essential test is whether the owner -'(that is, the 
/ 
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person having title at the time delinquent tax proceedings 
were initiated) has thereafter transferred to a third person 
or such person has acquired his title to the propcrty prior to 
the e1iective date of the curative acts. 
[2] It is argued by the Chamberlains that because the deed 
from the California Bank to the plainti1is was not recorded 
until August 16, 1943, after the effective date of the curative 
act, the Miller case is not controlling in view of the provisions 
of the recording acts voiding unrecorded interests in real 
property as against a subsequently recorded interest acquired 
in good faith and for a valuable consideration (see Civ. Code, 
§§ 1214,1215). Their claim appears to be that when the 1943 
curative act became effective, the tax deed to the state, al-
though theretofore executed and recorded, became valid, and 
as it was recorded before the deed from the California Bank 
to plainti1is, the latter is ineffective. This argument cannot 
prevail for the obvious reason, that the burden was on the 
Chamberlains of proving that the state, when it took thl! deed 
or when the curative act became effective, was acting in good 
faith-without notice of plaintiffs' interest. (Bell v. Pleasant, I 
145 Cal. 410 [78 P. 957, 104 Am.St.Rep. 61] ; Thomas v. Van-
Lieu, 28 Cal. 616; Chapman v. Ostergard, 73 Cal.App. 739 
[238 P. 1081] ; Lindley v. Blumberg, 7 Cal.App. 140 [93 P. 
894]) and there is no evidence on that subject. 
[3] Among the irregularities urged in the tax sale proc-
ess, is the claim that the notice of the sale to the state, culmi-
nating in the deed to the state on July 1, 1938, failed to specify 
the correct amount of taxes for which the property was as-
sessed and sold. The published delinquent tax'iist in 1933 
upon which the sale by operation of law was basM, lists the 
delinquency as $56.46, which presumably embraced all taxes, 
penalties and (lOsts due on the property as prescribed by sec-
tion 3764 of the Political Code in 1933. The addenda to the 
delinquent tax list which was published in 1938 and led to 
the deed to the state of July 1, 1938, stated that notice was 
given that on July 1, 1938, the following described property 
would be deeded to the state on July 1,1938, unless redeemed. 
Under a column designated" Least Amount Accepted at Sale," 
and opposite a description of the property here involved, ap-
pears the sum of $58.46 ($2.00 more than the amount in the 
first mentioned delinquent list). At the time of the publica-
tion and the execution of the deed to the state, provision was 
made for deeding the propcrty to the state rather than a sale 
to a private purchaser (Pol. Code, § 3817 d, as of 1938), and 
) 
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the notice of such deeding was required to be published in the 
addenda and to state the amount for which the property was 
sold to the state (that is, previously sold by operation of law). 
(Pol. Code, § 3817d, as of 1938.) As seen, the addenda in the 
instant case did not purport to give the amount for which the 
property was sold to the state but listed the amount under the 
heading "Least Amount Accepted at Sale" and the amount 
was $2.00 greater than the amount for which the property was 
sold to the state. 
The delinquent list with the addenda constituted the only 
notice to the owner that his property would be deeded to the 
state. The notice was defective in that it failed to state cor-
rectly the amount for which the property was sold to the state 
and the designation of the nature of the figure stated. It 
therefore failed to comply with the statute. Such failure to 
comply with the statute in regard to notice is fatal. (Knokf 
v. Swan, 2 Ca1.2d 630 [42 P.2d 1019, 97 A.L.R. 841]; Gott-
8fein v. Kelly, 206 Cal. 742 [276 P. 347] ; HalZ v. Park Bank 
of Los AngeZes, 165 Cal. 536 [132 P. 452] ; M't1Zer v. WilZiams, 
135 Cal. 183 [67 P. 788] ; Warden v. Gries, 120 Cal.App. 187 
[7 P.2d 342]; Warden v. Broome, 9 Cal.App.172 [98 P. 252].) 
[4] The Chamberlains argue, however, that the deed to 
the state was conclusive evidence of compliance with the law. 
At the time of the deed to the state the statutes provided that 
the deed was "primary evidence that: 1. The property was 
assessed as required by law; 2. The property was equalized 
as required by law; 3. The taxes were levied in accordance 
with law; 4. The taxes were not paid; 5. At a proper time 
and place the property was, sold as prescribed by law, and by 
the proper officer; 6. The property was not redeemed; 
7. The person who executed the deed was the proper officer; 
8. Where the real estate was sold to pay a poll-tax or taxes 
on personal property, that the real estate belonged to the 
person liable to pay the tax." [Emphasis added.] (Pol. 
Code, § 3786.) The following section reads: "Such deed, 
duly acknowledged or proved, is (except as against actual 
fraud) conclusive evidence of the regularity of all other pro-
ceedings, from the assessment of the assessor, inclusive, up 
to the execution of the deed." [Emphasis added.] (Pol. Code, 
§ 3787.) These sections must be read together, and it is ap-
parent that section 3787, which gives the effect of conclusive 
evidence as to all other proceedings, must refer to proceedings 
other than those mentioned in section 3786. As to the latter, 
) 
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the decd is only prima facie evidence. (Bernhard v. walt 
184 Cal. 612 [194 P. 1040) ; McDonough v. Cooper, 179 cat. 
384 [177 P. 153]; Hayes v. Ducasse, 119 Cal. 682 [52}'!"'1 
121].) [5] It is apparent, therefore, that under those sectionl 
(Pol. Code, §§ 3786, 3787) the deed is prima facie but not 
conclusive evidence of due publication of the delinquent tai" 
list and the giving of notice (see Gramson v. Geniella, 209 c8Jj 
610 [289 P. 817] ; Scott v. Beck, 204 Cal. 78 [266 P. 951]; 
Bell v. Brigance, 74 Cal.App. 322 [240 P. 50]), and where a 
notice is mailed, a direction to return it to the sender if not.t 
delivered within a certain time (which is different from that1 
fixed in the statute) is fatal. (Joslin v. Shaffer, 66 Cal.App.< 
69 [225 P. 307].) It must, therefore, follow, that the defecl, 
in the published delinquent tax list which gave notice of the 
deeding of the property to the state, being embraced within. 
the italicized portion of subdivision 5 of section 3786 as above 
quoted, was not cured by the deed here involved which was 
only prima facie evidence of the regularity of the tax sale . 
proceedings. For those reasons we hold that the notice here 
involved, which failed to comply with the statute (specify cor-
rect amount for redemption of property), constituted a defect i 
in the sale, and hence the property was not sold at a proper J 
time and place as required by law under subdivision 5 of sec-
tion 3786. The presumption to the contrary is rebuttable and I· 
falls under section 3786 rather than section 3787. It was re-, 
butted in this case. ('. 
[6] It is urged that the deed I~~in the state to the Cham-
berlains executed in 1944 was conclusive evidence of the regu- \. 
larity of all the proceedings from and including the assessment. 
But in 1938, when the property was deeded in the fore-
closure proceeding to the California Bank, such tax deed was 
merely prima facie evidence of the regularity of such pro-
ceedings. (Pol. Code, § 3897, as it read in 1938.) Although 
such a deed was later made conclusive evidence (see Rev. & 
Tax. Code, § 3711 formerly Pol. Code, § 3836.1 as added in 
1939, Stats. 1939, ch. 529), that change in the law, if applied 
to the facts of this case, would have the same effect as a cura-
tive act. Before it was made conclusive evidence the interest 
of California Bank had intervened, and under Miller v. Mc-
Kenna, npra, its interest was vested and could not be divested 
by the change in the law. The plaintiffs, although they ac-
quired their title after the change in the evidentiary effect 
of the deed, acquired the right of the California Bank. If 
that were not true the vested interest of an intervening owner 
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would be of small value, inasmuch as any change in the law 
validating the tax proceedings after he acquired his intereSt 
would deprive him of the right to transfer such interest. Such 
cases as Mercury Herald Co. v. Moore~ 22 Ca1.2d 269 [138 
P.2d 673, 147 A.L.R. 1111] ; Bray v. Jones, 20 Ca1.2d 858 [129 
P.2d 857] ; South San Joaquin lrr. Dist. v. Neumiller, 2 Cal. 
2d 485 [42 P.2d 64], and Buck v. Canty, 162 Cal. 226 [121 P. 
924], to the effect that the state may, at any time after property 
is dE>eded to the state, change the method of its disposition and 
cut off the right to redeem, do not alter the result. Here we 
have statutes purporting to eure defects, which, to be appli-
cable here, and cut off an intervening vested right, must cure 
a fatal defect in the proceeding for sale of the property to the 
state. 
Finally, it is urged that plaintiffs' action is barred by the 
limitation provision found in the Revenue and Taxation Code, 
reading: "A proceeding based on an alleged invalidity or 
irregularity of any deed to the State for taxes or of any pro-
ceedings leading up to the deed can only be commenced within 
one year after the date of recording of the deed to the State 
in the county recorder's office or within one year after June 
~, 1941, whichever is later . 
•• Sections 351 and 358, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure do not apply to the time within which a proceeding 
may be brought under the provisions of this section." (Rev. 
& Tax. Code, § 3521.) 
It is conceded that the time limitation specified in said 
section had elapsed when the instant action was comInenced. 
However, prior to the decision of this case by the District 
Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two 
(Hall v. Chamberlain, (Cal.App.) 183 P.2d 743) no mention 
of the above-quoted section was made by any of the parties 
nor was any claim made by them that the proceeding was not 
timely brought. The Chamberlains first relied upon that sec-
tion in this court after the District Court of Appeal bad made 
it a ground for its decision. 
[7] The general rule is firmly established that if a statute 
of limitation is not pleaded it is waived. (16 Cal.Jur. 603-
604.) [8] In the instant case plaintiffs' action was phrased in 
the conventional terms of one to quiet title. Inasmuch as tax 
deeds were outstanding, for plaintiffs to prevail it was incum-
bent upon them to negative such deeds, and the Chamberlains 
should have pleaded the statute of limitation to that issue. 
Even if we put the matter in a different way, that is, assum-
I 
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ing that plaintiffs would rely upon their conveyance from th; 
record owner, defendants would counter with the tax deeds,. 
plaintiffs would assert the invalidity of those deeds, and d~ 
fendants would reply that the statute had run, the need for', 
pleading the statute still exists. ' .~ 
[9] To escape the effect of the general rule the Chamber-
lains advance the argument that statutes of limitation may b8~ 
pleaded by pleading the facts rather than making a specific; 
reference to the statute involved. They rely upon such cases' 
as Osborn v. Hopkins, 160 Cal. 501 [117 P. 519, Ann.Cas. 
1913A 413]; Tofte v. Tofte, 12 Cal.App.2d 111 [54 P.2d 
1137]; Franklin v. Southern Pacific Co., 40 Cal.App. 31. 
[180 P. 76], and refer to the allegations in the answer of d~' 
fendant Ventura County: "That on or about the 1st day of' 
July, 1938, the defendant Robert S. Cooney, duly elected, , 
qualified and acting Tax Collector of the County of Ventura,·, 
did execute and deliver to the State of California a deed con-
veying to the State of California the property described in 
said paragraph III, for delinquent taxes as provided by law, 
said deed being recorded in Volume 498, at page 380, Official 
Records of Ventura County; that thereafter, on or about' 
March 20, 1944, in the manner provided by law, the said ' 
property was sold by the said Robert S. Cooney to the defend- ,1' 
ant Henry Chamberlain; that thereafter the said Robert S. 
Cooney duly made and executed a deed conveying said prop-
erty to the said Henry Chamberlain, said deed being recorded . 
in Volume 691, at page 283, Official Records of Ventura' 
County." Assuming defendants, the Chamberlains, may take 
advantage of the pleading of the codefendant, Ventura 
County, yet the "facts" are not pleaded. The essence of the 
rule requiring the statute to be pleaded is to apprise plaintiff 
that defendant intends to rely upon that defense. While it 
may be that inferentially, the times being stated, it follows 
that the action was, not timely filed under the statute, yet 
more is required. There must be some expression that lateness 
of the commencement of the action is a ground of defense. It 
is the contention of the Chamberlains that the effect of see-
tion 3521 is' to vest title in the state, but it is manifestly noth-
ing more than an ordinary statute of limitation, that is, • 
personal defense which may be waived. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C.~., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., COD-
eurred. 
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Had the property remained in the hands of the owner-mort-
gagor until the effective date of the Curative Act of 1943, 
the deed to the state would unquestionably have been vali-
dated by that act. (Miller v. McKenna, 23 Cal.2d 774, 781-
782 [147 P.2d 531], and cases there cited.) Under the ma-
jority opinion, however, the rights of plaintiffs and their 
immediate predecessor in interest, whether or not they had 
actual or constructive notice of the claims of the state, are 
greater than those of the owner-mortgagor, even though they 
took title to the land subject to the prior claims of the state 
for the delinquent taxes. 
The question whether plaintiffs or their predecessor are 
bona fide purchasers is not considered in the majority opinion 
or in Miller v. McKenna, supra, upon which it relies, although 
the rule relied upon is designed solely for the protection of 
innocent third persons. (McFaddin v. Evans-Snider-Buel 00., 
185 U.S. 505, 510-511 [22 8.Ct. 758, 46 L.Ed. 1012] ; United 
Statcs Mortgage 00. v. Gross, 93 Ill. 483,494, aff'd, 108 U.S. 
477 [2 S.Ct. 940, 27 L.Ed. 795] ; see 16 Am.Jur. 449.) The 
foreclosure deed to the California Bank was executed after 
the taxes had been delinquent for nearly five years. Plaintiff 
did not even show that the California Bank acquired the fore-
closure deed without actual notice of the claim of the state for 
taxes, which was a matter of public record. The plaintiffs 
themselves acquired whatever rights the California Bank had 
in the property after the deed to the state had been recorded, 
and there is no shoWing that they acquired that interest with-
out actual notice of the claims of the state. 
Under established principles of law plaintiffs could have 
no rights against the state superior to that of their prede-
cessors in interest. The court in this case and in the Miller 
case creates for plaintiffs a vested right in the minor defects 
in the tax deed to the state. I can find no basis in reason or 
authority for the creation of this right and must therefore 
dissent for the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in 
Miller v. McKenna, IUpra, 23 Cal.2d 774, 792. 
Edmonds, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied May 20, 
1948. Traynor, J., voted for a rehearing. 
